QRZ! Ham Radio 1/QRZ Ham Radio Callsign Database - December 1993.iso/ucsd/races/opswhat.txt

Text File | 1992-07-07 | 7.7 KB | 149 lines

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          OPSWhat  Version 1. 3     3/1/92



WHAT TO EXPECT IN EMERGENCIES
[Category OPS]
Both the Responder and the Agency Officials are urged to review
the materils under Disaster Critiques in the Management section
for that contains vital real-on-the-firing-line experience by
those who lived through some of the California disasters.

ARE YOU REALLY EARTHQUAKE FREE?
A recent comment by an eastern seaboard resident was: "California
is the only place that need worry about earthquakes, so why
bother us with all your earthquake information?" I was reminded
of this statement when the March/April 1989 issue of "RESCUE"
arrived at this office. A color map of the U.S. shows graphically
how erroneous is such a statement. The seismic risk map shows
that areas of CA, NV, AZ, WA, UT, ID, MT, MS, AR, TN, KY, IL, NY,
VT, MA, NC and SC are subject to MAJOR DAMAGE. These same, and
several other, states are subject to MODERATE DAMAGE, and an even
larger number of states are prone to MINOR DAMAGE. Only parts of
TX, LA, and AL are subject to NO DAMAGE. Food for thought.  RB062

LOMA PRIETA OES RESPONSE OVERVIEW
As is always the case, the recent Santa Cruz earthquake
demonstrated that there are never enough communications
facilities available when disaster strikes. In the hundred mile
long affected area telephone service was partially knocked out
and that which remained in service was totally overloaded.
Microwave public service links went down as antennas were
mis-aligned, towers buckled and power failed. The result was a
huge lack of information about what damage had occurred, what was
needed and where it was needed, and where recovery effort
priorities should be placed.
The State of California RACES quickly came on line to supplement
limited circuits between government agencies where they existed,
and to provide communications where all regular circuits had been
disrupted. At the Governor's Office of Emergency Services HQ,
in-place RACES radio assets were manned within minutes. Solid
communication links into the affected regional OES command posts
in turn were in communication with the key units in their
recovery plans. The RACES links had a vital part in knitting
governmental recovery operations into a viable, efficient effort.
For the first five days, RACES radio rooms were manned around the
clock. Then, as regular government and commercial circuits were
restored, RACES operations were reduced, but not before Jon
Madzelan, Chief of OES Telecommunications, told the RACES that
"We couldn't have done it without you."  RB090

There were many lessons to be learned from the actual operation
in a major disaster recovery situation. Some of them follow:
1. Government furnished, pre-positioned, tested radios and other
equipment are vital to successful communications in and out of
headquarters where operational direction and control is
accomplished.
 2. Sufficient RACES staff must be available, known in advance to
be committed to their particular assignments, when disaster
strikes.
3. The RACES units must be good enough to be considered as
members of the professional staff by the fulltime, paid disaster
workers. This, of course, means regular contact between the RACES
and paid staff, planning and exercising jointly.
4. The use of tactical callsigns is basic to success. Ham calls
that change as individual operators change can and do cause
confusion and disruption. FCC callsign rules must be met, of
course, but the tactical call sign is paramount. "KB6ABC at OES
Region 2" meets requirements and lets other locations know what
they need to know and with what part of the system they are
talking. The use of individual callsigns should be minimized and
limited to meeting FCC requirements.
5. Hard copy is better than voice, where messages addressed to
third parties must be delivered with zero chance of error. Packet
radio provides hard copy and allows logging each message
automatically for retrieval or any future need.
6. As far as the end user is concerned the means of communication
are normally invisible and should be so. The goal of the system
is to move information and/or data as rapidly as possible,
neither adding or subtracting anything in the process.  RB091

 FLIGHT 232 COMM LESSONS LEARNED
United Airlines flight 232 crashed in Sioux City, Iowa, on July
19, 1989. Here is a brief summary of the lessons we learned:
1. Centralize control and decision making.
2. Plan for the worst.
3. Extend handheld range with a portable repeater.
4. Have packet capabilities.
5. Tape record all repeater communications.
6. Document each potential volunteer's skills.
7. Maintain regular contact with service agencies.
8. Meet regularly to discuss disaster preparedness.
Sgd MIKE NICKOLAUS, NF0N, EC Dakota County, Nebraska
DOUG POTTS, KA0VHV, Asst. EC, Woodbury County, Iowa ALAN
PEDERSON, KA0VNM. Asst. EC, Dakota County, Nebraska.  RB092

COMMUNICATIONS WILL ALWAYS FAIL!
"You can depend on it: communications ALWAYS fail in a disaster!"
So reports Joseph Scanlon, Director of Emergency Communications
Research Unit, Carleton University in the Alberta (Canada) Public
Safety Services INSIGHT publication. The following excerpts from
his article are food for thought, education and planning:
While working as a consultant, I was asked by an engineer how
often communications fail in a disaster. I replied, "always." He
looked at me in disbelief; so I asked a colleague, Dr. E. L.
Quarantelli. His reply? "Communications always fail in a
disaster."
Though that's a fact--and there's lots of evidence to support
it--the hardest message about disasters to get across to
emergency managers is that, at times, now matter how well
prepared, they won't know what's going on.
Take the tornado which hit Edmonton, July 31, 1987. There was
damage and destruction including downed power and telephone
lines. Traffic routes were impassable. There was flooding, enough
to block many north-south arteries. There were toxic chemical
incidents. Emergency radio systems--police, fire and
ambulance--were overloaded. Part of the phone system was
destroyed. No one, for a time, could possibly know what happened.
That doesn't mean that Edmonton's plan, based on a central EOC,
didn't work. It means it took time before the EOC had the
information needed to make useful decisions.
Any disaster--no matter how well handled--has some communication
problems, some uncertainty.
Effective emergency planning must assume such problems will
occur. It must accept that there will be periods of uncertainty.
And it must have systems in place to overcome the inevitable
failures of communications.
I always liked what the mayor of one Canadian city once told me.
He said that everything had gone wrong during an exercise, and
that when things become confused during a real disaster, he was
in good shape because "confusion seemed normal."

A word about disasters versus emergencies. Emergencies are
serious events which require coordinated response to protect the
health, safety and welfare of people, or to limit damage to
property. Disasters differ substantially in nature; they are not
just large emergencies. Disasters are disruptive and cause
organizations and systems to break down. After a disaster the
recognized stages of response are: (a) initial confusion with
only individual response to immediate personal needs (b)
decentralized response (c) coordinated response (d) cleanup (e)
recovery. Disruption is a key feature of the confusion and
decentralized response after a disaster.
[This concludes the article by Joseph Scanlon. He has spent 19
years studying crisis and disaster, examining the problems of
emergency planning, and emergency management.] RB 109 and 110